Quantum states for perfectly secure secret sharing by Chi, Dong Pyo et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
4.
47
97
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  3
0 A
pr
 20
08
Quantum states for perfectly secure secret sharing
Dong Pyo Chi,1 Jeong Woon Choi,1 Jeong San Kim,2 Taewan Kim,1 and Soojoon Lee3
1 Department of Mathematical Sciences, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea
2 Institute for Quantum Information Science, University of Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada
3 Department of Mathematics and Research Institute for Basic Sciences, Kyung Hee University, Seoul 130-701, Korea
(Dated: November 3, 2018)
In this work, we investigate what kinds of quantum states are feasible to perform perfectly secure
secret sharing, and present its necessary and sufficient conditions. We also show that the states
are bipartite distillable for all bipartite splits, and hence the states could be distillable into the
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state. We finally exhibit a class of secret-sharing states, which have an
arbitrarily small amount of bipartite distillable entanglement for a certain split.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Mn
Introduction.— Entanglement has been considered as
one of the most crucial resources for quantum commu-
nication, which has been shown to be perfectly secure
against any interior/exterior eavesdropper. The perfect
security seems to be due to the pure entanglement. How-
ever, in the case of the quantum key distribution, appro-
priately defining its perfect security as in Refs. [1, 2], we
can see that only pure entanglement does not guarantee
the perfect security.
We here focus on another quantum communication
protocol, the quantum secret sharing of classical infor-
mation, originally presented by Hillery et al. [3]. Our
question is what kinds of quantum states are feasible to
perform the perfectly secure secret sharing (PSSS). In
order to answer this question, first of all, it is required to
present the conditions for the PSSS.
One of the most important problems in secret sharing
of classical information is how to share random bits se-
curely between one dealer, Alice and other players, Bob
and Charlie. If each participant would securely share one
TABLE I: Random bits for secret sharing
Alice Bob Charlie
0
0 0
1 1
1
0 1
1 0
of the random bit sequences as in TABLE I, then Alice
could secretly make Bob and Charlie share her secret bit.
Thus, for the PSSS, the two following conditions must
be satisfied: (i) Probability distributions of all partici-
pants’ secret bits should be unbiased and perfectly corre-
lated, that is, if we let pijk be the probability that Alice,
Bob, and Charlie get the random bits i, j, and k, respec-
tively, then p000 = p011 = p101 = p110 = 1/4 and pijk = 0
for other i, j, k. (ii) Eavesdropper should not be able to
obtain any information about participants’ secret bits.
In this work, according to the two above conditions, we
show that ρABCA′B′C′ is a quantum state for the PSSS
if and only if it is of the form
1
4
∑
i+j+k≡0 (mod 2)
i′+j′+k′≡0 (mod 2)
|ijk〉ABC〈i′j′k′| ⊗ UijkρA′B′C′U †i′j′k′ ,
(1)
where ρA′B′C′ is a state on subsystem A
′B′C′, and Uijk’s
are unitary operators. We call this form of states in (1)
the secret-sharing states.
We also show that the states are bipartite distillable
for all bipartite splits. From the results of Du¨r et al. [4]
we can readily derive the fact that if any n-qubit state
has negative partial transposition for all bipartite splits
then it is distillable into the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) [5] state. Hence, the secret-sharing states could
be also distillable into the GHZ state.
Furthermore, we show that our results can be general-
ized into multipartite cases, that is, ρn is an n-qubit state
for the PSSS consisting of one dealer and n− 1 players if
and only if it is of the form
1
2n−1
∑
I,J∈Z
n
2
even parity
|I〉A1A2···An〈J | ⊗ UIρA′1A′2···A′nU
†
J , (2)
where ρA′1A′2···A′n is a state on subsystem A
′
1A
′
2 · · ·A′n,
and UI ’s are unitary operators, and that ρn is bipartite
distillable for its all bipartite splits. Hence, as in the
three-party case, ρn could be distillable into the n-qubit
GHZ state.
Secret-Sharing States.— We first provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for a state to perform the PSSS.
Let A, B, and C be qubit systems, and A′, B′, and C′
be of arbitrary dimensions. Here AA′, BB′, and CC′ are
Alice’s, Bob’s, and Charlie’s systems, respectively. Then
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Any state is a quantum state for the 3-
party PSSS if and only if it is a secret-sharing state of
the form in (1).
Proof. We first assume that ρABCA′B′C′ is a quantum
state for the PSSS, and let |Ψ〉ABCA′B′C′E be its purifi-
2cation as follows:
|Ψ〉ABCA′B′C′E =
∑
i,j,k
√
pijk|ijk〉ABC |Ψijk〉A′B′C′E ,
(3)
where E is the system of the eavesdropper, Eve. Since
probability distributions of all participants’ secret bits
are unbiased and perfectly correlated, it is clear that
p000 = p011 = p101 = p110 = 1/4 and pijk = 0 for other i,
j, k. Thus, the state |Ψ〉 becomes
1
2
∑
i+j+k≡0 (mod 2)
|ijk〉ABC |Ψijk〉A′B′C′E . (4)
For each of all participants’ measurement result ijk,
let ρEijk be Eve’s state after the measurement. Then
ρEijk = trA′B′C′ (|Ψijk〉〈Ψijk|). Since Eve cannot obtain
any information about participants’ secret bit at all, we
have ρE000 = ρ
E
011 = ρ
E
101 = ρ
E
110. For each i, j, k, let
ρEijk =
∑
l λl|φl〉〈φl| be its spectral decomposition. Then
it follows from Gisin-Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (GHJW)
theorem [6] that for each i, j, k, there are unitary oper-
ators Uijk on the system A
′B′C′ such that
|Ψijk〉 =
∑
l
√
λlUijk|ψl〉A′B′C′ |φl〉E , (5)
where |ψl〉 forms an orthonormal set for the system
A′B′C′. Hence, by Eqs. (4) and (5), ρABCA′B′C′ is of
the form
1
4
∑
i+j+k≡0 (mod 2)
i′+j′+k′≡0 (mod 2)
|ijk〉ABC〈i′j′k′| ⊗ UijkρA′B′C′U †i′j′k′ ,
(6)
where ρA′B′C′ =
∑
l λl|ψl〉〈ψl|.
Conversely, we now assume that a given state
ρABCA′B′C′ is of the form (1). Then since for the prob-
abilities pijk that participants get the bits ijk p000 =
p011 = p101 = p110 = 1/4 and pijk = 0 for other i, j, k,
probability distributions for the secret bits are clearly un-
biased and perfectly correlated. Thus, it suffices to show
that Eve cannot any information about the secret bits,
that is, ρE000 = ρ
E
011 = ρ
E
101 = ρ
E
110, where ρ
E
ijk is Eve’s
state when participants’ measurement result is ijk. For
convenience, we consider the following block matrix form
of ρABCA′B′C′ :
1
4


X000,000 0 0 X000,011 0 X000,101 X000,110 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X011,000 0 0 X011,011 0 X011,101 X011,110 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X101,000 0 0 X101,011 0 X101,101 X101,110 0
X110,000 0 0 X110,011 0 X110,101 X110,110 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


,
(7)
where Xijk,i′j′k′ = UijkρA′B′C′U
†
i′j′k′ . Then we can read-
ily obtain that the trace norm of Xijk,i′j′k′ is one, that
is, ‖Xijk,i′j′k′‖1 = 1. Let the state in Eq. (4) be the
purification of ρABCA′B′C′ . Then we have Xijk,i′j′k′ =
trE (|Ψijk〉〈Ψi′j′k′ |). It follows from straightforward cal-
culations that
‖Xijk,i′j′k′‖1 = tr
∣∣∣
√
ρEijk
√
ρEi′j′k′
∣∣∣ = F (ρEijk, ρEi′j′k′ ),
(8)
where F is the fidelity. Since F (ρEijk, ρ
E
i′j′k′) = 1 for every
i, j, k, the proof is completed.
We remark that, as seen in the proof of Theorem 1,
in order to prove its converse, it is sufficient to use
that the trace norms of three well-chosen off-diagonal
blocks are one, for example, ‖X000,011‖1 = ‖X011,101‖1 =
‖X101,110‖1 = 1. Moreover, any block matrix of the form
in (7) whose three well-chosen off-diagonal blocks have
trace norm 1/4 forms a secret state as follows.
Theorem 2. σABCA′B′C′ is a state which can be ex-
pressed as the following block-matrix form:
σABCA′B′C′ =


⋆ 0 0 X 0 ⋆ ⋆ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⋆ 0 0 ⋆ 0 Y ⋆ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⋆ 0 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ Z 0
⋆ 0 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ ⋆ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


, (9)
where ‖X‖1 = ‖Y ‖1 = ‖Z‖1 = 1/4 if and only if
σABCA′B′C′ is a secret-sharing state.
Proof. Since any secret-sharing state is of the form (9), it
suffices to show that σABCA′B′C′ in (9) is a secret-sharing
state. For each ijk, let pijk be the trace of (ijk, ijk) block
entry of σABCA′B′C′ . Then
|Ψ〉 = √p000|000〉ABC |Ψ000〉A′B′C′E
+
√
p011|011〉ABC |Ψ011〉A′B′C′E
+
√
p101|101〉ABC |Ψ101〉A′B′C′E
+
√
p110|110〉ABC |Ψ110〉A′B′C′E (10)
is its purification, and hence we obtain
X =
√
p000p011trE (|Ψ000〉〈Ψ011|) ,
Y =
√
p011p101trE (|Ψ011〉〈Ψ101|) ,
Z =
√
p101p110trE (|Ψ101〉〈Ψ110|) . (11)
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we have
‖X‖1 = √p000p011F
(
ρE000, ρ
E
011
)
,
‖Y ‖1 = √p011p101F
(
ρE011, ρ
E
101
)
,
‖Z‖1 = √p101p110F
(
ρE101, ρ
E
110
)
, (12)
3where ρEijk = trA′B′C′ (|Ψijk〉〈Ψijk|). Since ‖X‖1 =
‖Y ‖1 = ‖Z‖1 = 1/4, we have the following inequalities:
p000 + p011
2
≥ √p000p011 ≥ 1
4
,
p011 + p101
2
≥ √p011p101 ≥ 1
4
,
p101 + p110
2
≥ √p101p110 ≥ 1
4
. (13)
It follows from the fact p000+ p011+ p101+ p110 = 1 that
p000 = p011 = p101 = p110 = 1/4 and F
(
ρE000, ρ
E
011
)
=
F
(
ρE011, ρ
E
101
)
= F
(
ρE101, ρ
E
110
)
= 1. This implies that
σABCA′B′C′ is a state for the PSSS. Therefore, it is a
secret-sharing state by Theorem 1.
We note that every private state is distillable [7]. By
employing this note, we now show that every secret-
sharing state is bipartite distillable for its all bipartite
splits.
Theorem 3. Let ρ be a secret-sharing state for the 3-
party secret sharing. Then ρ is bipartite distillable for its
all bipartite splits of the 3 parties.
Proof. By Theorem 1, ρ can be expressed as the form of
(1) for some state ρA′B′C′ and unitary operators Uijk.
Let CNOTij be the controlled-NOT operation such that
i and j represent its control system and target system,
respectively. Then applying CNOTBC to ρ and perform-
ing the projective measurement on system B with respect
to the standard basis {|0〉, |1〉}, when the measurement
result is r, the resulting state becomes a private state,
1
2
1∑
i,j=0
|ii〉AC〈jj| ⊗ UiriρA′B′C′U †jrj , (14)
which is distillable [7]. Thus, a given ρ is bipartite distil-
lable for the split AA′-BB′CC′. Similarly, we can show
that ρ is bipartite distillable for the splits BB′-CC′AA′
and CC′-AA′BB′.
Generalization into multipartite cases.— We now gen-
eralize our results into multipartite cases.
Theorem 4. ρn is a quantum state for the n-party PSSS
consisting of one dealer and n− 1 players if and only if
it is a secret-sharing state of the form in (2).
Proof. Let |Ψ〉 be a purification of ρn as follows:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
I∈Z
n
2
√
pI |I〉A1A2···An |ΨI〉A′1A′2···A′nE . (15)
As in the case of the 3-party case, it is clear that
pI = 1/2
n−1 for all I with even parity and pJ = 0 for
other J . For each of all participants’ measurement re-
sult I, Eve’s state after the measurement, ρEI becomes
ρEI = trA′1A′2···A′n (|ΨI〉〈ΨI |). Since Eve cannot obtain
any information about participants’ secret bit at all, all
ρEI ’s are the same. Thus, by GHJW theorem there are
a state ρA′1A′2···A′n and unitary operators UI on the sys-
tem A′1A
′
2 · · ·A′n such that ρn is of the form in (2) and
ρA′1A′2···A′n has the same spectrum as ρ
E
I .
Conversely, assuming that a given state ρn is of the
form (2), it can be readily shown that ρn is a state for n-
party PSSS, by the same way as the proof of Theorem 1.
We call the state in (2) the n-party secret-sharing state.
Remark that, as in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, any quan-
tum state of the form of 2n×2n block matrix, whose block
entries vanish if they are in the rows or columns of odd
parity, has well-chosen 2n−1 − 1 off-diagonal block en-
tries of the trace norm 1/2n−1 if and only if the state is
an n-party secret-sharing state.
We now consider the bipartite distillability of the n-
party secret-sharing states.
Theorem 5. Any n-party secret-sharing state ρn is bi-
partite distillable for all bipartite splits of the n parties.
Proof. We use the mathematical induction on n ≥ 3.
Then if n = 3 then this theorem is true by Theorem 3.
We assume that this theorem is true for (n − 1)-party
secret-sharing states. Let P be an arbitrary bipartite
split I0-I1 of the n parties, {A1A′1, A2A′2, . . . , AnA′n}.
Then for AjA
′
j , AkA
′
k ∈ I0 applying CNOTAjAk to ρn
and performing the projective measurement on system
Aj with respect to the standard basis {|0〉, |1〉}, the re-
sulting state becomes an (n − 1)-party secret-sharing
state. By the induction hypothesis, the state is bipar-
tite distillable for the split, I0 − {AjA′j}-I1, and hence
ρn is also bipartite distillable for I0-I1. This completes
the proof.
Example.— We construct a class of secret-sharing
states in a similar way to one presented in [1]. Consider
the following state:
ρ = a0|ψ0〉〈ψ0| ⊗ σ0 + a1|ψ1〉〈ψ1| ⊗ σ1
+a2|ψ2〉〈ψ2| ⊗ σ2 + a3|ψ3〉〈ψ3| ⊗ σ3, (16)
where
|ψ0〉 = 1
2
(|000〉+ |011〉+ |101〉+ |110〉),
|ψ1〉 = 1
2
(|000〉+ |011〉 − |101〉 − |110〉),
|ψ2〉 = 1
2
(|000〉 − |011〉+ |101〉 − |110〉),
|ψ3〉 = 1
2
(|000〉 − |011〉 − |101〉+ |110〉), (17)
and the states σj have support on orthogonal subspaces.
Then one can readily verify that ρ is a 3-party secret-
sharing state, since ‖a0σ0 ± a1σ1 ± a2σ2 ± a3σ3‖1 = 1.
As in Ref. [1], one can find a secret-sharing state which
can have an arbitrarily small amount of bipartite distill-
able entanglement for a certain split. In order to find such
4a state, take a0 = a1 and a2 = a3 such that a1+a2 = 1/2,
and
σ0 = ρs ⊗ |0〉〈0|,
σ1 = ρa ⊗ |0〉〈0|,
σ2 = ρa ⊗ |1〉〈1|,
σ3 = ρs ⊗ |1〉〈1|, (18)
where ρs and ρa and two extreme d⊗ d Werner states
ρs =
2
d2 + d
Psym =
I + F
d2 + d
,
ρa =
2
d2 − dPas =
I − F
d2 − d (19)
with the identity operator I on the d ⊗ d system
and the flip operator F = ∑d−1i,j=0 |ij〉〈ji|. Then we
have ‖ρTAA′ ‖1 = (d+ 2)/d. Therefore, since the log-
negativity is an upper bound of the distillable entangle-
ment [8], the bipartite distillable entanglement for the
split AA′-BB′CC′ can be arbitrarily small by increasing
d. Nevertheless, the state is always a secret-sharing state
for any d.
In conclusion, we have presented necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for secret-sharing states, and have also
shown that any secret-sharing state is bipartite distill-
able for its all bipartite splits, and hence the states could
be distillable into the GHZ state. We have furthermore
generalized our results into multipartite cases, and have
exhibited a class of secret-sharing states, which have an
arbitrarily small amount of bipartite distillable entangle-
ment for a certain split.
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